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abstract 
If an insider trades on prixáleged information. then one vvould expect to see insiders 
purchase in days before the security price increases and sell them in the days before the 
security price declines. This is the main study hypothesis on which we have based our 
investiuation. Numerous studies in different countries have found that insiders do trade 
around events or news that intluence firm value and that on average they do abnormal 
profits. We try to replicate those investigations in the Portuguese stock market. 
Our investigation aims to detect and measure the existence ot insider trading abnormal 
profits during the period from January 2001 to December 2005. It covers. vvhen available. 
ali insider transactions from companies belonging to the Eurolist írom Euronext Lisbon. 
To decide whether or not insiders time their trades, we use the traditional methodology of 
event studies to test the existence of abnormal returns around the days vvhen insiders 
purchase or sale their company shares. We also tested it the magnitude and duration oí 
abnormal profits depend signifícantly on firm-specifíc and transaction-specific factors 
(such as industry classification. firm size, firm valuation and relative trading volume of 
the insider transactions). 
The practical objective of our research is to answer the following question; Do insiders 
buy (sell) shares prior to stock price raise (decline)? 
Keywords: insider trading; information and market efficiency; event studies; abnormal 
retum; corporation and securities law; asymmetric and private iníormation. 
JEL Classification: G14. K22. D82. 
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RESUMO 
A questão subjacente a esta investigação é a de saber se os "insiders das cotadas 
portuguesas usam informação privilegiada para negociarem acções das empresas às quais 
estão liuados. A investigação procura replicar, para Portugal, estudos académicos já 
realizados noutros mercados mundiais, muitos dos quais, mesmo em mercados 
regulamentados, chegaram à conclusão que os "insiders lucram com a informação 
privilegiada de que dispõem ou a que podem ter acesso. 
O objectivo final da tese é responder à seguinte questão: será que os designados 
"insiders" compram (vendem) acções das empresas a que estão ligados antes de uma 
subida (queda) das cotações dessas firmas? 
Para isso iremos aplicar a metodologia do estudo de eventos e testar se o ganho 
"anormal" nos períodos à volta das transacções dos "insiders é signiíicatix amente 
diferente de zero. A metodologia é aplicada às empresas admitidas à negociação no 
mercado regulamentado da Euronext Lisbon no período compreendido entre 2001 e 200^. 
Nesta investigação também procuramos testar se a magnitude e a duração da 
rendibilidade "anormal" dependem de íactores especiticos da empresa ou das transacções 
(tais como a classificação sectorial, a dimensão e a avaliação da empresa e o volume de 
transacções subjacente a cada compra ou venda por parte dos "insiders ). 
Palavras-chave: "insider trading"; informação e eticiència do mercado; estudo de 
eventos; retorno anormal; regulação; informação privada e assimétrica. 
Código de classificação JEL: G14. K.22, D82. 
4 
Do Insiders Time Their Trades? Evidence from Euronext Lisbon 
INDEX 
1. INTRODUCTION  
2. LITERATURE REV1EW  
2.1. Decomposing Insider Trading  
2.2. Differences in the Regulation  
2.3. Differences in the Methodology  
3. THE PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION  
3.1. Legal Framework  
3.2. Evidences of Illegal Inside Trading  
3.3. The Study Hypothesis  
4. DATA CONSTRUCTION  
4.1. Final Sample  
4.2. Sample Adjustments  
5. METHODOLOGY  
5.1. Market Model  
5.2. Abnormal Return and its Statistical Properties  
5.3. Aggregation Through Time and Across Securities 
6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
6.1. Firm and Transaction-Specific Factors  
6.2. Methodology Adjustments  
7. CONCLUSIONS  
8. REFERENCES  
Do Insiders Time Iheir Trades? Evidence from Euronext Lisbon 
listoftables 
-I -1 
Table 1; Enquiries Carried Out by CMVM" Enforcement Department  
O "7 
Table 2: Transactions Excluded from lhe Sample  
Table 3: Frequency Distribution of Insider Trading by Industry Classiíication 29 
Table 4: Cut offof insider trading events by firm size. P/B. P/E and relative trading 
, 30 
volume  
Table 5; Results of Tests to Abnormal Retum 41 
Table 6; Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns for Insider Trading Events 41 
Table 7: Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns for Insider Trading by Industry 
1 ^ 
Classification  J 
Table 8; Cumulative Daily Abnormal returns for Insider Trading Events by Firm Size...44 
Table 9; Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns for Insider Trading Events by Relative 
Trading Volume  
Table 10; Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns for Insider Trading Events by Pnce to 
Book Ratio  
Table 11; Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns for Insider Trading Events by Price 
Earnings Ratio ^ 
Table 12: CAR for Insider Trading Events Using the Mean Adjusted Retum Model 48 
Table 13: CAR Taking into Account the Clustering Issue 49 
Table 14; CAR Taking into Account the Clustering Issue and a Non-Overlapping 
Approach ^ 
Table 15; Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns Using the Market Adjusted Return 51 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Average Abnormal Return 40 
Fisure 2; Cumulative Abnormal Return 42 
6 
Do Insiders Time Their Trades? Evidence from Euronext Eisbon 
Acknowledgements 
We appreciate the helpful suggestions and insightful comments made by João Duque. 
Marco Bonomo. Qinglei Dai. Victor Cardoso and Ana Sousa. We would also like to 
thank Niã, Dinho and Carla for their encouragement throughout this project. 
7 
Do Insiders Time Their Trades? Evidence from Euronext Eishon 
1. 1NTRODUCTION 
"Unless [...] insiders just happcned to posscss superior uncdytical ahility. their excess 
return nmsl he due to thc i lie pai exploilalion of insider informalion . 
Insider trading literature deals with the following question: do insiders make use ot non- 
public information to earn profits larger than they vvould have had if they traded on the 
available public-information? Numerous studies in different countries have tound that 
insiders do trade around events or nevvs that influence firm value and that on average they 
do abnormal profits. 
We investigate the profitability and information content of insider trading in the 
Portuguese stock market. The practical objective of our research is to ansvver the 
following question: Do insiders buy (sell) shares prior to stock price raise (decline)'? 
In our study we assume insiders to be those individuais who are compelled to intorm the 
Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM - Comissão do Mercado de l alares 
Mobiliários) about the purchase and disposal of shares from the company with which 
they are related. CMVM is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the 
Portuguese stock market and tries to guarantee its integrity and transparency. Therefore 
the regulator, through the Portuguese Securities Code (CVM - Código dos Valores 
Mobiliários) imposes a rule set to prevent insiders from using privileged information 
while trading stocks of their own firms. The Portuguese Securities Code (article 378. 
n.03) describes privileged information as ali non-public information that. being accurate 
and with respect to any issuer or securities or other financial instruments, would he 
capable, if it was given advertising, of influencing in a sensitive manner its price in the 
market. 
1 Elfon and Gruber (1995) 
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Xotwithstandine. throuehout our sample period CM\'M lias deteeted oeeasional 
suspieious situalions in lhe da>s immediaiel> preeeding the diselose ot intormalion likel> 
to have a sienitieani eíteet on share pnees. 
Our in\estiealion aims to deteet and measure the existenee ot insider trading abnormal 
profits durine lhe period from Januaip 2001 to Deeember 2005. It will co\er. uhen 
a\ailable. ali insider transaelions on eompanies trom Euronext Lisbon belonging to the 
Eurolist. 
Fo decide uhether or not corporate insiders time their trades. \ve use the traditional 
methodolog\ ot' e\ ent studies to lest the existenee ot' abnormal returns around the da> s 
uhen insiders purehase or sale their comparo shares. According to MacKinlay (1997), a 
major success of this methodologç is the implicit acceptance ot event study by the U.S. 
Supreme Court tor determining malerialitç in insider trading cases and tor determining 
appropriate disgorgement amounts in cases ot traud. Foliouing the literature, vve also 
lested iF tire magnitude and duration of abnormal protits depend signiticantly on tirm- 
specific and transaction-specific tactors (such as industry classiticalion. tirm size, tmn 
ealuation and relatic e trading volume of the insider transactions). 
Event studies also serve an important purpose in capital market research as a vvay ot 
testing market efficiency. Systematically nonzero abnormal security returns that persist 
after the insider transaclion are inconsistent with market etticiency. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature 
review. Chapter 3 presents the problem identification. vvhere we summarize the legal 
framework regarding insider trade activity in Portugal. Chapter 4 describes the data and 
provides the summary statistics and chapter 5 the methodology applied. Chapter 6 
discusses the empirical results and chapter 7 concludes the study. 
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2. LITEFLATURE REVIEVV 
Man> studies conclude that insiders can earn abnormal profits through trading stocks ol 
their own firms. Nevertheless. the intensity, pattem. duration and significance ot those 
profits have varied substantially across countries and markets. The magnitude oí 
abnormal profits depends on firm-specific and transaction-specific tactors (such as firm 
size, trading volume, etc.). and the conclusions may also depend on whether insiders are 
purchasing or selling shares. The conclusions can be affected by moditying the standard 
event studv methodology assumptions. and the regulation and enforcement ot insider 
trading lavvs can also play a major role. This particular aspect turns this research very 
market dependent since in each market a different regulation is applied. 
Early investigations conducted in the U.S. showed that insiders are able to earn 
significant exceptional returns. around 5%, during the first tive months after trading. 
Jaffe (1974) found evidence that insiders can predict price movements in their own 
securities. testing the information content of the Ofíicial Summary. the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) monthly report listing the transactions of corporate 
officials. For ali the samples in bis study, he concluded that SEC" publication contains 
information on the future stock price. However. after adjustment for transaction cost. only 
intensive trading samples (the only ones that possessed residuais greater than the cost of 
transaction) vvere earning statistically large returns. 
Following Jaffe, Baesel and Stein (1979) tested the profitability of insider trading 
activities in Canada, but they chose to divide the trading activities into two subgroups: a 
set of trades by ordinary insiders and a set of insider trades made by bank directors. Their 
results also contrasted vvith the classically stated strong form of the efficient market 
hypothesis. Indeed, they found that both ordinary insiders and bank directors earned 
positive premium returns relative to an uninformed trading strategy. Bank directors 
earned larger premiums than ordinary insiders. This was particularly true for purchases, 
which the authors believe better represent trades relying on information. The reason. 
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accordinc to the research. is the fact that bankers have information sets v\hich contain 
those of ordinary insiders as subsets. 
Also in Canada. Heinkel and Kraus (1987) vvent beyond the traditional event study 
approach and developed a portfolio performance measures tor the aggregate insider and 
his her trading partner (outsider) that measure portfolio return over the entire sequence ot 
insider (and outsider) trades. They analysed just small companies vvhere insiders account 
for a larue fraction of ovvnership and transactions. According to their study. insiders vvill 
choose to trade on superior information onl\ it they can earn abnormal proíits (i.e.. abo\ e 
a risk-adjusted market rate of return) by their trading. Any such abnormal proíit may 
implv abnormal losses to the parties on the opposite sides ot the trades. The latter parties 
vvere termed ""outsiders"". The major conclusion was that. despite being able to identiiy 
particularly profitable transactions. the insiders do not. over ali their trades, outperform 
the outsiders. While cumulative abnormal return results indicate that some insider trades 
are profitable. the portfolio results do not support the hypothesis ot superior insider. 
Moss and Kohers (1990) chose to examine just those insiders trading in U.S. in events 
occurring prior to earning and dividend announcements. Their investigation tried to íind 
if corporate insiders are able to profit enough from their transactions so as to outperform 
the stock market by buying their company"s stock prior to favourable earning and 
dividend announcement of their firm. Similarly. they were expecting insiders to avoid 
losses by selling their company"s stock prior to untavourable earning and dividend nevvs. 
Following Jaffe (1974). they used data from the Official Summary of Securities 
Transactions and Holdings published by SEC. during the years 1982 and 1983. Their 
results clearly indicate that insiders were able to outperform the market for each one of 
the four types of announcements examined. In the case of the two positive news 
announcements (earning greater than expected and dividend increases). they vvere able to 
generate risk-adjusted excess returns, while they used the negative announcement 
(earning lower than expected and dividend decreases) to time their selling in order to 
prevent significam losses in the market value of their stock holdings. The authors suggest 
that SEC has not been effective in bringing total efficiency to the market. 
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Kabir and Veanaelen (1996) also analysed the relationship between insider tradirm and 
earnina announcements, but have used liquidity (measured by trading volume) rather than 
stock return to detect the existence of inside trading activity. Erom 1987 onwards. 
insiders at Amsterdam Stock Exchange vvere no longer allowed to trade two months 
before an annual earnings announcement. The study proposed to find ií. as a result oí the 
reaulation. trading volume prior to the restricted period increased (since insiders might 
vvant to liquidate their positions prior to the start oí the restricted period). The results 
demonstrate that stocks became less liquid vvhen insiders vvere not allowed to trade. The 
studv also found some evidence that the introduction oí insider trading restrictions 
reduced the stock market's speed of adjustment to positive earnings nevvs. 
More recently. Calvo and Lasfer (2002) tested insiders" abnormal return using data from 
203 U.K.. companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). over the period írom 
January 1997 to December 2001. Considering an event vvindow oí 10 days beíore and 
after the insider trading, they found that insiders" purchases (sales) are preceded by 
negative (positive) abnormal returns during the ten days beíore the transaction date. The 
cumulative abnormal returns over the [-10. -1] period amount to -2.18% íor the buy 
transactions and to 1,74% for the sell trades. Over the [+1. +10] period. the buy 
transactions are followed by positive returns of 1.56% vvhile after the sales share prices 
decrease by 1.94%. 
2.1. Decomposing Insider Trading 
Several authors show that the magnitude and duration of abnormal profits may also 
depend significantly on firm-specific and transaction-specific factors. Furthermore. 
profits may also depend on vvhether insiders are buying or selling their firm securities. 
Some authors like Seyhun (1986) argue that the quality of information also varies from 
insider to insider. Insiders vvho are expected to be more knovvledgeable vvith the overall 
affairs of the firm. such as chairmen of the boards of directors or officer-directors. are 
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more successful predictors of future abnormal stock price changes than oííicers or 
shareholders alone. Evidence also suggests that insiders can discern the ditterences in the 
value of their information and trade greater volumes of stock to exploit more valuable 
information. Tvvo years latter, Seyhun (1988) discovered that insiders in small firms, who 
are more successful predictors of their firms" performance, tend to trade mostly on hrm- 
specific information. Insiders in large firms, on the other hand. are more likely to trade on 
the basis of economyw ide factors rather than firm-specific factors. 
Besides the traditional sample division between buying and selling activities. Jeng eí al. 
(1999) decomposed insider trading along several dimensions: trade volume, size oí the 
firm. insider"s position in the frm. and whether the trade is executed directly íor an 
insider or indirectly for another party. They tirst constructed a rolling "purchase 
portfolio"" that holds ali shares purchased by insiders for a six-month period; an analogous 
"sale portfolio" holds ali shares sold by insiders for six months. The six-month horizon 
vvas chosen to coincide vvith the "short-svving"" rule of the Securities and Exchange Act oí 
1934 (a rule that prohibits profit taking by insiders for ofísetting trades vvithin six 
months). The authors then employ performance-evaluation methods to analyse the returns 
to the purchase and sale portfolios. The results show that the purchase portíolio eams 
abnormal returns of more than 50 basis points per month. On the other hand. the sale 
portfolio does not earn abnormal returns. They also found that the abnormal returns to 
insider trades in small hrms are not significantly different trom those in large firms, and 
that top executives do not earn higher abnormal returns than do other insiders. The 
conclusions contrast with the Seyhun (1986) finding. The authors suggested a positive 
relationship between trade volume (fraction ot firm equity traded in each insider 
transaction) and insider informativeness, showing that abnormal returns tor the high- 
volume and medium-volume purchase portfolios are economically large and statistically 
signifícant. Performance measures for the sale portíolios are íound to be economically 
small and statistically insignificant. 
The pattern of stock prices being more dependent on purchases than sales is common in 
U.K. and U.S. insider trading literature. One possible explanation. advanced by 
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Friederich et ai. (2000). is that block purchases convey more information than block 
sales. They argue that decisions to buy should. on average. be more inlormation-based 
and decisions to sell should be more liquidity-based. They analysed data on the trades 
executed bv executive directors for the period 1986-1990 in the LSE. It was chosen not to 
focus on the most liquid stocks (FTSE 100 companies) since previous vvork shovved 
hiaher uross abnormal returns in less-liquid securities. It was found that lor diiector 
purchases, abnormal returns are significantly negative in the twenty days betore the net 
purchase. implying that directors purchase shares on average after a dovvnvvard run in 
share price (of about 3%). After the insider transaction, the share price clearly recovers 
and abnormal returns are positive on most days, so that abnormal return over the 20 days 
after the director"s trade averages a significant +1.9%. The patterns are symmetrical in 
the case of director sells. though the magnitude of abnormal returns is lower. as stated 
above. Directors typically sell shares after a run of positive price movements over twenty 
days of about +1,25%. and abnormal returns are predominantly negative after the 
directors" sale. so that excess returns have averaged about -1.5% twenty days after the 
event. 
Calvo and Lasfefs (2002) findings also suggest that insider purchases convey more 
information into the market. Besides the examination ot stock price abnormal 
performance around insider trading activity described early, they provided evidence oí a 
relationship between insider trading and news released after each transaction. They 
searched ali the news items over the period ot íour months (80 trading days) after the 
insider transaction. finding a total of 67 ditferent types ot news, which they have 
classified as good, bad or neutral according to prior market expectations. They found that 
most purchases are followed by good news while sales are not necessarily followed by 
bad news. The probability that an insider purchase is followed by firm-specific good 
news amounts to 70,9%. In contrast, insiders" sales followed by bad news represent only 
24% of the cases. 
Cheuk et ai (2006) reached different conclusions when studying price movements of 
legal insider transactions in Hong Kong. Contrary to the U.S. and U.K., where corporate 
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insiders make larger profits from their insider purchases than from sales. they found that 
Hong Kong insiders actually obtain more profits from sales. One possible explanation is 
that insider sales in Hong Kong are far less common than insider purchases. Thereíore. it 
is understandable that vvhen insiders self outsiders are more likely to perceive that the 
activities are driven by valuable private Information than vvhen insiders buy. They 
conjecture that since a larger proportion of Hong Kong insiders are owner-managers 
relative to the case of U.S. companies, they sell relatively less frequently for fear of 
losinc corporate control. The abnormal performance of stocks traded by insiders in Hong 
Kong was examined according to industry classification. tirm size. book to market ratio, 
price earnings ratio and relative trading volume oí the insider transactions. The results 
show that some insider purchases produced large and persistent abnormal retums. These 
purchases have some common denominators: the tirm concerned is usually a finance or 
industrial company. the firm is small in terms of market value. the book to market ratio ot 
the firm is large. the price earnings ratio of the íirm is small, and the relative trading 
volume of the purchase is large. This last result confirms Jeng et ai (1999) fmdings. For 
insider sales. the post-event cumulative average abnormal retums are significantly 
negative in the aggregate. as vvell as for sub-groups that are formed according to tirm and 
transaction specific characteristics. 
2.2. Differences in the Regulation 
The results may also depend on the country and exchange under scrutiny. since different 
insider trading laws may affect the ability of insiders to take advantage of their privileged 
information. Many studies detecting abnormal profits from insiders suggest that insider 
regulations during the sample period were unable to curb insider abnormal profits. 
Different insider trading laws and enforcement of those laws throughout different 
countries and time can help explaining why not ali investigations reached similar results. 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) made a survey on the existence and the enforcement of 
insider trading laws around the world. The study ot the 103 countries (including Portugal) 
that have stock markets reveals that inside trading laws exist in 87 of them. but 
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enforcement - as evidenced by prosecutions - has taken place in only 38 of them. Before 
1990. the respective numbers vvere 34 and 9. This led them to conclude that the existente 
and the enforcement of insider trading laws in stock markets is a phenomenon of the 
1990s. The authors tried to find oul if inside trading laws affect the cost oí equity. To put 
it in another way, if insider trading is found to increase the cost ot equity. corporations 
would pav stock exchanges a premium to limit insider trading. everything else being 
constam. If equity markets are informationally efficient, and it insider trading laws affect 
the cost of equity, it follows that there will be an immediate impact on trading statistics 
on the day insider trading laws are changed. Using the asset pricing model and the 
dividend discount model as an approximation method to compute the cost oí equity. they 
found that the cost of equity in a country. after controlling a number ot other \ ariables, 
does not change after the introduction of insider trading laws. but decreases significantly 
after the first prosecution. Beny (2005) complemented Bhattacharya and Daouk s (_00_) 
vvork. The author tested whether differences in specific legal elements ot countries 
insider tradina laws are associated vvith ditterences in the structure and performance oí 
their stock markets. using financial, legal, and institutional data from a cross-section of 
33 countries. It was found that countries with more prohibitive insider trading laws have 
more diffuse equity ownership. more accurate stock prices and more liquid stock markets. 
2.3. Differences in the Methodology 
Event study methodology is typically applied to examine the profitability of insider 
transactions. This methodology. still in use today, has a long history and accordmg to 
MacKinlay (1997) perhaps the first published study is Dolley (1933). In this work. he 
examines the price effects oí stock splits, studying nominal price changes at the time ot 
the split. Over the decades ranging from the early 1930s until the late 1960s the levei of 
sophistication of event studies increased. In the late 1960s seminal studies by Ray Ball 
and Philip Brown (1968) and Eugene Fama et al. (1969) introduced the methodology that 
is essentially the same as the one in use today. Ball and Brown considered the 
information content of earnings. while Fama et al. studied the effects ot stock splits. 
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The vvorks published by Brown and Warner in 1980 and 1985 tested various 
methodologies used for calculating the normal or expected returns in the event studies. 
Given a sample based on randomly securities and event dates, a partieular levei of 
abnormal return was artificially introduced into the aforementioned sample. transforming 
the actual return data. The study hypothesis is based on the fact that randomly selected 
securities should not. on average. exhibit any abnormal return. The 1980 paper considers 
monthly data vvhile the 1985 paper deals with daily security data. The 1980 investigation 
found that a simple methodology based on the market model performs well under a vvide 
variety of conditions. In some situations. even simpler methods. which do not explicitly 
adjust for marketwide factors or for risk. perform no worse than the market model. They 
tried in 1985 to test the applicability of these conclusions to event studies using daily 
data. The results from simulations with daily data generally reinforce the tindmgs oí their 
previous work with monthly data; methodologies based on the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) market model and using standard parametric tests are well-specified under a 
variety of conditions. They also discovered that daily data generally present few 
difficulties in the context of event study methodologies. for instance in cases involving 
variance increases or unusually high autocorrelation. 
More recently MacK-inlav (1997), on which we have based our investigation. reviewed 
and summanzed the event study methodology. The author also used the market model 
and found evidence strongly supporting the hypothesis that eaming announcements do 
convey Information useful for the valuation of firms. 
Traditionally, the market model relating security returns to market portfolio returns is 
employed in the event study literature, and abnormal returns are residuais obtained from 
the market model around the event window. Notwithstanding. not considering a time- 
varying svstematic risk property and autocorrelation in the return series mav be an 
importam drawback of the market model. Chiang et al. (2004). analysing performance of 
insider trading on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) have chosen to follovv the 
conditional Jensen's alpha approach proposed by Eckbo and Smith (1998) that considers 
a multi-factor model, instead of traditional market model. The multi-factor model 
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includes information and risk tactors. and accounts for autocorrelation in the return series 
in the estimation using the generalized method of moments. Hence. this method is able to 
erab ali those effects not accounted for in the market model. Chiang ct al. (2004) have 
employed the conditional Jensen"s alpha approach and the market model as well. but the 
resulls from both approaches were similar, showing that insider trading does not gain any 
abnormal returns in the TWSE. 
Del Brio ct al. (2002) also analysed whether the measure of abnormal returns is sensitive 
to charmes in the return-generating model. They studied the proíitability and intormation 
content of insider trading in the Spanish stock market. They estimated two diíferent 
expected-returns models to measure the sensitivity ot measured excess retuins to changes 
in the model. They used the traditional market model and a modified market model 
adjusted bv conditional-heteroskedasticity. This second model attempts to remove some 
of the deficiencies of the market model vvhen describing the stochastic behaviour ot asset 
returns. Conditional heteroskedasticity has widely been found vvhen vvorking vvith high 
frequency financial data. Therefore. efficient estimating methods must take such a 
phenomenon into account. In this sense, they modify the market model bv incorporating 
an accurate measure of volatility through a GARCH model that also accounts for some 
specifíc characteristics of their study (i.e.. large sample size, unknown transaction prices 
and relatively short estimation periods). The period under study ranged trom January 
1992 to December 1996. and the firms selected were ali non-financial firms listed on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange and the Spanish continuous market. They found that return size 
is very similar and the conclusions dravvn by the diíferent models are very close. 
supporting Brown and Warner"s (1985) findings. Nonetheless, Del Brio et al. (2002) 
found that in specifíc dates, the "traditional" market model underestimates the variance of 
the returns. favouring the acceptance of the null hypothesis". Traditional test statistics 
assume stable variances. meaning that there is no change in variance between the 
estimation period and the event period. 
:
 One possible solution is to use non-parametric tests that do not depend on the assumption of normality. 
Because non-parametric test do not use the return variance, this test can be more appropriate in case of 
event-induced variance. 
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3. THE PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
If an insider trades on privileged information. then one vvould expect to see insiders 
purchase in days before the security price increases and sell them in the days betore the 
security price declines. This is the main hypothesis on vvhich we have based our 
investication. If non-informed investors are avvare of the wealth transfer induced by 
insider tradinsz. they refrain from trading. resulting in illiquidity. and therefore 
inefficiency in the markets. Beny (2005) found that countries vvith more prohibitive 
insider trading lavvs have more accurate stock prices and more liquid stock markets. Thus. 
examining the profitability of insiders is both an examination of the usefulness oí msider 
information and the effectiveness of the Portuguese Securities Code regulations regarding 
market abuse. 
As a result, regulators tried to impose a rule set to enhance investor s contidence about 
the fairness of trading in the financial market. The Portuguese Securities Code (article 
378. n.0l) imposes that whoever holds privileged information due to its capacity as 
member of a managing or supervisory body of an issuer or holder oí a holding in the 
respective capital, and transmits this information to someone outside the regular scope of 
its functions or. based on this information, trades or advises someone to trade in securities 
or other financial instruments, or orders their subscription. acquisition. sale or exchange. 
directly or indirectly, for itself or someone else. should be punished by imprisonment for 
a maximum of three years or by a tine. 
3,1. Legal Framework 
In the Portuguese financial market there are two legal frameworks to control and pre\ent 
inside trading activities that compel companies to release information about insider 
trading data. 
On one hand, companies must comply vvith the "Commercial Company Code" (Chapter 
VII - Publicity of Ownerships and Market Abuse, article 447. 0). This code imposes that 
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board members and supervisor members of a public company should declare to lhe 
company the number of shares and bonds held. as vvell as ali company shares and bonds 
sold and bought. This is also extended to those firms controlled by the company . This 
communication must be done 30 days follovving the event and must be published as an 
appendix to the company annual report. The "Commercial Company Code (Chapter \ II 
- Publicity of Ownerships and Market Abuse, article 448. c) also establishes that if an 
insider buys or sells shares and bonds based on Information about the company. vvhich is 
not yet public and is susceptible of having an intluence on the security value. he must 
compensate for the damages. In this situation. any shareholder could request for his 
judicial resignation. 
On the other hand, inside trading is also regulated by the "CMVM Regulation N . 7 _001 
Corporate Governance (vvith the amendments introduced and re-published b\ CM\ \I 
Resulation NT 11/2003)"". According to the article 3 of this regulation. CMVM must be 
informed of the purchase and disposal of shares admitted for trade in a regulated market 
involving: a) Members of the board of directors of the company issuing the shares; b) 
Members of the board of management of a parent company of the issuer of the shares; c) 
A company controlled by one of the persons mentioned in items a) and b). and d) A 
person actiníi on behalí oí the persons mentioned in items a) and b). In our in\ estigalion, 
we assume these individuais to be insiders. They are required to notify the in\ ested 
company of the transactions vvithin seven working days after the exent. The in\ ested 
company shall immediatelv notify CMVM ot the information receixed. The notilication 
mentioned above must include; i) The legal nature ot the tact that originated the 
acquisition or disposal and the date vvhen the transaction took place. n) The number oí 
shares purchased or disposed oí and the number oí shares held b\ the declarer after the 
trade; iii) The purchase or sale price ot the shares. The items described on i) (date) and ii) 
(number of shares bought and sold) are the basis ot our database research. 
The article 2 Io of the CVM establishes that control is deemed to exist between a natural or legal 
individual and a company when, regardless ot whether the domicile or headquarters is located in Portugal 
or abroad. that said individual is capable ot exerting, directly or indirectly, a dominant intluence o\er said 
company. 
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Aside from those tvvo "nationaF" legal framevvorks, there was a legislative authorization 
in 2005 in order to revievv the Portuguese Securities Code. This had in mind the 
transposition of the "Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) . The 
•"Directive 2003/6/EC" was transposed into Portuguese lavv on the 31 st of March _006. 
The "White Book about Corporate Governance in Portugal" published in 2006 by IPCP - 
Instituto Português cie Corporate Governance. regarding this directive. highlights as a 
new disposition the one allowing to "apprehend the patrimonial advantages that have 
their origins in the crime of insider dealing and market manipulation. and use those 
patrimonial advantages in favour of those who have suttered damages. and ha\ e 
judiciallv complained . The Government, on the other hand. emphasizes the íirms dutv 
of creating a list of ali persons who have access to privileged Information, as well as the 
financial intermediaries" responsibility to iníorm the authorities about any suspicious 
transactions regarding information abuse. 
3.2. Evidences of Illegal Inside Trading 
In spite of the leual framework, CMVM has detected various illegal insiders trading 
activities as reported on its annual reports. The activities reported by the regulator are 
onlv related to illegal inside trading, which means the acquisition or disposal of financial 
Instruments by a person who knows, or should knovv, that the intormation possessed is 
inside information. The article 3 of the "CMVM Regulation N .7/2001 carne into force 
on 1 Eebruary 2002. Thus, for the financial year commencing on January 2001. ali 
companies vve have included in our sample have already started disclosing their annual 
reports with information in appendixes regarding inside trading actions. 
Table 1 shows that in 2001. before the article 3 of the "Regulation NT7/2001" carne into 
force, inside trading activity (16 enquiries) represented 35% of the enquiries carried out 
by the Enforcement Department of CMVM (46 enquiries). It was the biggest percentage 
of the enquiries investigated by the CMVM. Ten inquines of inside trading were brought 
forward and six new ones were received, totalling 16 inquines. 
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Table I: Enquiries Carried Out by CMWrs Entorcement Department 
Passed on Received Total Completed Pendiím Jud. Auth. 
tnqun icí i i 
Abuse of Information 10 6 16 13 3 4 
Market manipulation 6 9 6 j j 
0 Unauthorised intennediation 4 0 4 4 0 




Cooperation with judiciam authorities 




















Unauthorised performance ot intermediation 
Other criminal offences 
Other breaches of regulations 
Cooperation with judiciary authorities 



































Inside trading •> 7 9 5 4 
-> 
Market manipulation 1 8 9 6 3 0 
Unauthorised financial intennediation 10 5 15 7 8 0 
Other criminal offences 0 1 1 1 0 1 
0 Other breaches of regulations n 4 4 0 
Cooperation with judiciary authorities 0 4 4 3 1 0 
Request for intemational assistance 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Total 15 28 43 26 17 3 
F.nauiries (2004) 
Inside trading 4 7 11 6 5 
Market manipulation 3 4 7 4 3 
Unauthorised financial intennediation 8 8 16 14 
Other criminal offences 0 1 1 1 0 
Other breaches of regulations 0 3 3 -> 1 
Cooperation with judiciary authorities 1 1 -i 0 
Request for intemational assistance 1 3 4 4 0 
Total 17 27 44 33 11 
F.nauiries P005) 
Abuse of Information 5 6 11 6 5 
Market manipulation 3 4 7 4 3 
Unauthorised financial intennediation -) 4 6 3 3 
Other criminal offences 0 0 0 0 0 
Other breaches of regulations 1 7 8 4 4 
Cooperation with judiciary authorities 0 4 4 3 1 
0 Request for intemational assistance 0 4 4 4 
Total 11 29 40 24 16 






2004 and 2005. 
Cases reported bv CMVM' Enforcement Department to the judicial authorities. 
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Out of these. four cases were reported by the Entorcement Department to the judicial 
authorities. As a result. without the regulation into torce, 2001 was the year with the most 
intense illegal inside trading activities in the period analysed in our investigation. In 
2002 with the renulation alread_\ into torce, the illegal inside trading cases dropped to 
less than a half. representing just lò0o of the total inquines carried out hy the 
Entorcement Department. Only three proceedings with evidence ot inside trading were 
passed on to the Director of Public Prosecutions. In 2003. 2004 and 2005 the weight ot 
inside trading activity on the total enquiries carried out by the Entorcement Department 
increased again to 210o. 25% and 28%. respectively. 
In the meantime. Portugal witnessed the first condemnatory sentence for the crime ot 
inside trading. pronounced by the Criminal Court in Lisbon on 25 July 2003. The Court 
convicted a non-executive member of lhe Board ot Directors and shareholder in the 
company "Vidago. Melgaço & Pedras Salgadas. SA", as the mastermind of the crime of 
inside tradinn. In short. the material tacts proved that in July 1996. the accused had been 
aware of his fathefs intentions to sell "Vidago" to "Jerónimo Martins". It was also 
proved that the accused monitored the negotiations between the two companies. 
Simultaneously, he bought severa! blocks ot shares in "Vidago between July and 
October of 1996. which he then sold in the special stock market section with the intention 
of determining the outcome of the public sale oftering. carried out in January 1997, 
which allowed him to obtain capital gains of around 4 millions euros. 
According to the CMVM 2004 annual report. investigations into potential insider trading 
show "that many suspicious situations arise in the days immediately preceding the 
disclosure of information likely to have a significam effect on share prices in the 
securities market. especiallv with regard to the ventication ot annual or quarterly results 
(favourable or unfavourable to the issuer), mergers. cessations or transformation and, 
more frequently. announcements of public acquisition offerings". This is the reason why 
the "White Book about Corporate Governance in Portugal" recommends that "members 
of the board and the partners of a company should refrain themselves from trading the 
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companv" securities in an interx al of time defined around lhe dates ot the publieation ot 
^ --4 
pnee sensitive events . 
3.3. The Study H\ pothesis 
In our in\eslieation. \ve anal> se the abnormal return for eaeh companv to identiiy these 
(illeaal) and other potential insider trading activities. Therelore, our sample includes not 
only those illegal inside trading activity reported by the regulator in its annual reports. but 
other transactions (cases in vvhich the regulator considered that an investigation vvas not 
justified) dropped b\ the CMVM"s Enforcement Department as vvell. We have based our 
inv estiuation on one main hypothesis: that an insider earns abnormal returns it after 
purchases (sales) stock prices rise (decline) abnormally. We try to answer the questions 
using the traditional event study methodology. vvhere the null hypothesis to be tested is 
whether abnormal returns in the event day and for the surrounding period are 
significantly different from zero. 
Abnormal returns are also analysed tor industry classiíication, as vvell as tor samples 
grouped bv firm size. relative trading volume, price to book ratio (P/B) and price earnings 
ratio (P/E). 
Wong (2002) found that vvhen cumulative daily excess returns are separated by firm size 
according to each firnTs market capitalization. only the smallest capitalization shows 
significam returns within the post event period. Small firms are found to generate the 
largest and most persistent abnormal profits. 
Trading volume is found to be positively associated vvith the quality of information. 
Relative trading volume is therefore used as an indicator of the quality of information 
associated with each insider transaction. 
4
 CMVM does not impose any restrictions forbidding insiders from trading around the publieation of price 
sensitive events. Some companies, however, have internai rules forbidding trading before and after the 
publieation of annual or quarterly results. 
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The sample is also grouped and ranked by P B and P E to examine if insiders take into 
account their company valuation while trading shares ot their own tirms. lt is 
hypothesized that high P B may predict bad performance, while low P B value predicts 
cood performance. ' The literature also documented (see Cheuk et ai. (2006)) a negative 
relationship between P E and future stock returns. W ilh this \ aluation hypothesis. ue aie 
expecting to see purchases with high (low) P B and P E to perform worse (better). On the 
other hand. we do expect to see sales with high (low) P B and P E to pertorm well 
(poorly). 
5
 Cheuk et ai (2006) assume this hypothesis, using the book to market ratio. We assume the same 
hypothesis using the inverse ratio; the price to book ratio. 
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4. DATA CONSTRUCTION 
Our oriíiinal sample included the 55 shares listed in the Eurolist from Euronext Lisbon at 
lhe end of 2005. We excluded three foreign companies from lhe sample. since those vvere 
cross-lisled shares. The sample vvas therefore reduced to 52 issues. Four olher companies 
had listed two different classes of shares. For each one of those companies. we decided to 
select onlv the most liquid class. which reduced the sample to 48 issues. matching 48 
companies. We then collected the inside trading information (the date and the amount ot 
shares bought and sold by insiders). The sample vvas afterwards reduced to 31 secunties. 
since 17 companies had no record oí inside trading activity or their trades did not fulfil 
some of the criteria that vvill be described later. 
The sample period of this study is January 2001 to December 2005, covering two years oí 
market slump (Portuguese benchmark PSI-20 dropped 24.73% in 2001 and 25.62°o in 
2002), and three years of market rally (PS1-20 gained 15.84% in 2003: 12.64% in 2004 
and 13,40 %in 2005). 
Each company"s data was manually collected from their annual reports available at the 
Portuguese watchdog Internet website. Data on daily cash-dividend-adjusted stock 
returns vvere obtained from the Bloomberg terminal database. For each companv. as vvell 
as for the benchmark index, we have extracted daily closing prices to calculate their daily 
returns. Our analysis only considered insider transactions dealing vvith shares, which led 
us to drop ali transactions vvith bonds and other company s related securities. such as 
derivatives. The transactions upon treasury"s stocks vvere also dropped. 
Within the sample period, we initially collected 2.426 insider transactions. Then. 
following Del Brio et al. (2002). we excluded a number of transactions that are not likely 
to be driven by privileged information. To assure that our sample consisted only of 
insider transactions motivated by the possession of private information, we dropped ali 
transactions made for non-informational reasons. As a result. we eliminated ali trades 
related to inheritances, gifts, bonuses, acquisitions or disposals by conversion or 
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CMVM. This criterion leads us to remove 378 transactions. most of them (81/o) 
representing an increase in corporate ovvnership, We ignored hundreds ot buy and sell 
orders made by investment banking and brokers6. We assume those transactions not to be 
related neither to the exploitation of privileged information nor ovvnership reasons. W e 
presume they are pait of banks" core business as they act as íinancial intermediary. trader 
or market maker. 
Ali the above-described screening resulted in 1.284 eligible transactions. which means an 
averace of 41 trades per company. We have identitied an average oí 55 ditíerent insiders 
trading in each year. representing an average ot 4.7 transactions per insiders during the 
sample period. The breakdown by type of insider is 51 individual insiders per year and 4 
corporate insiders (companies with less than a 2% ovvnership) per vear. 
In cases vvhere an insider has carried out more than one transaction in a particular day. we 
include only one transaction. adding up the shares purchased or sold. This screening 
reduced the sample to 1.080 observations. with 686 purchases and 394 sales. There vvere 
transactions vvhere either the same or different directors from the same firm vvere trading 
in different directions (e.g.. a purchase of 25.000 shares and a sale oí 201.793 on the 
same day). In this case. net transactions vvere reported (i.e.. 176.793 as sale). The sample 
was then reduced to 1.059 trades. Finally, we have also applied the Brown and Warner 
(1985) procedure: for a security to be included in the sample. it must have at least 30 
daily returns in the entire period (estimation window plus the event window), and no 
missing return data in the last 20 days. This allovvs us to reduce the influence oí 
asynchronous trading. 
4.1. Final Sample 
With this last screening our sample was reduced to 1.052 transactions. and the number of 
firms dropped from 31 to 28. Nevertheless. the remaining companies cover ali the nine 
b
 Banks and brokers compelled to comply with the "CMVM Regulation Kv 7 2001 described early, acting 
on their own or on behalf of clients. 
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industry sectors quoted at Eurolist (as repoiled in Table 3) and cD0o ot the Portuguese 
market capitalization at the end of 2005. 
Table 3: Frequenc v Distribution of Insider Tradine b\ Industrv Classification 
Purchases Sales Ali Ratio of purchases Number ot 
T ransactions to sales companies * 
Financial 247 144 391 1.72 s 
Basic Materials 58 31 89 1.87 s 
Communications 142 1 14 256 1.25 5 
Consumer. Cvclical 154 25 179 6.16 4 
Consumer. Non-cyclical 8 10 18 0.80 j 
Diversified 1 0 1 - 1 
Industrial 47 55 102 0.85 j 
Technolorzv 3 1 4 3.00 1 
Utilities 7 5 12 1.40 1 
Total 667 385 1.052 1.73 28 
Note: * The figures in the column reter to the number of companies in that industry 
classification at the end of December 2005. Industry classifrcation is assigned by the 
Stock Exchange according to the nature of the business of the company. 
OveralE insiders from financial and communication industries are the most active in 
trading the stocks of their own firms. From those 28 securities preserved. 17 belonged to 
PS1-20 index at the end of the sample period. representing 98% oí the benchmark value. 
Purchases outnumher sales. split into 667 (63%) purchases and 385 (37%) sales. The ratio 
of insider purchases to insider sales is 1,73; E such that almost tvvo out ot three insider 
transactions are purchases. This can lead us to conjecture, betorehand, that insiders may 
seek benefits of corporate control instead oí short term trading profits. 
Although there are far more purchases than sales in each year of the sample period, the 
average number of shares per transaction is larger íor sales (64.945) than for purchases 
(26.152). The ratio between the average number of shares sold by transaction and the 
number of shares purchased by transaction is 2.48, which suggest that shares are usually 
sold in larger blocks. Seyhun (1998) also found that insiders in the U.S. are likely to 
break up purchases into smaller transactions for fear of insider trading sanctions. Ele 
suaaested that an insider purchase provides a stronger signal to both the authority and the 
general public than does an insider sale. Hovvever, insiders are not as concerned vvith 
insider trading regulations in sales transactions. It might be taken by the authority that the 
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motivations for profiting from the private information behind insider sales are le^s 
obvious. 
Table 4 summarizes inside trading activities cut ofí by íirm size. P B. P/E and relative 
trading volume, following Cheuk et aí. (2006) procedure. We use three cutoffs to classify 
ali transactions in each group. 
Table 4: Cut offof insider trading events bv firm size. relative tradina volume. P B and P E 
A - Firm size 
Purchases Sales 
Smallest 1/3 Médium 1/3 Largest 1 3 j Smallest 1/3 Médium 1 '3 Largest 1 3 
From 12 245 2.822 1 13 245 2.822 
to DDD 2.809 12.597 1 
DD") 2.809 12.597 
N D D D 222 223 1 128 128 129 
B - Relative tradine volume 
Purchases Sales 
Lowest 1/3 Médium 1 /3 Hitthest 1/3 Lowest 1/3 Médium 1/3 Highest 1/3 
From 0.0000°0 0.0008% 0.0037% 0.0000% 0.0016% 0,0093% 
to 0,0008% 0,0037% 1,4308% 0.001 5° o 0.009 l
0o 1.4767% 
N "OD 223 128 128 129 
C - Price to book value 
Purchases Sales 
Lowest 1/3 Médium 1/3 Flishest 1/3 Lowest 1/3 Médium 1/3 Flighest 1/3 
From 0.32 1,61 2.46 0.34 1.75 2.49 
to 1.60 2,45 25.69 1.75 2,49 15.48 
N 210 210 209 127 127 127 
D - Price earninszs ratio 
Purchases Sales 
Lowest 1/3 Médium 1/3 Hiszhest 1/3 Lowest 1/3 Médium 1/3 Highest 1/3 
From 1.55 11.11 15,46 3.10 12.90 17,98 
to 1 1.01 15,46 94.86 12,90 17.96 100.86 
N 141 141 141 99 99 99 
■m size is measured in mi lions of euros. Data regardim the market capitalization. the total number 
of shares outstanding, the P/B and P/E ratios were obtained from the Bloomberg terminal database. 
In order to tesl for the differences by firm size. companies in the sample are segregated 
into three groups according to their market capitalization at the time oí the insider 
transactions (small. médium and large size íirms). The size of an inside trading íirm is 
calculated for every transaction based on the month-end figures of the month prior to 
vvhen the insider trading occurred. 
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As in Cheuk et ul. (2006) and other studies. relativo trading volume is given as lhe ratio 
between total number of shares traded in the insider transaction and the total number ot 
outstanding shares of the stock ai that moment. Total number of outstanding shares is 
based on the month-end figure of the month prior to the month vvhen the insider trade 
occurred. Each transaction is then ranked by the relative trading volume (low, médium 
and hiuh) and is assigned to one of three groups: low relative trading volume, médium 
relative trading volume, and high trading volume. 
The P B is equal to a stock's price divided by its book value (i.e.. total stockholders 
equity) per share. The book value of the insider-trading firm, for every transaction, is 
based on the data from the most recent reporting period betore trading (quarterly. semi- 
annual or annual). In our sample. each transaction is ranked by the P/B ot the stock 
concerned and is assigned to one of the three groups; low P/B, médium P/B. and high 
P/B. In this particular analvsis we have dropped 42 transactions from our sample, since 
book value information was not available . 
The P/E is the ratio of the current share price to earnings per share (EPS) ot the past year. 
The EPS of the inside trading firm for every transaction is based on the tiscal year-end 
qaure of the year prior to that vear vvhen insider trading occurred. Similar to the analvsis 
vvith the previous ratio, each transaction is ranked by the P/E of the stock concerned and 
is assiuned to one of three groups; low P/E. médium P/E, and high P/E. In this 
examination. the sample ot 1.052 transactions was reduced to 720. since there were ja_ 
transactions where the respective EPS was negative and theretore P/E was not computed. 
4.2. Sample Adjustments 
Throughout this research, we have done some sample modifications and adjustments 
related to complications arising from violations of the statistical assumptions, being able 
to accommodate more specific hypotheses. 
7
 This is the reason why in Table 4 the number of purchases and sales (N) drops vvhen section C is 
compared vvith N in sections A and B. 
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The first one vvas brought forward by MacKinlay (1997) vvho states that while 
acereeatina the abnormal retums across tirms it is assumed that there is no clustering. 
meaning that the event windows of the included securities do not overlap in teims ot 
calendar time. This assumption allows us to calculate the variance ot the aggregated 
sample cumulative abnormal retums without concerning about the co\ariances across 
securities because they are assumed to be null. It this assumption is incoirect. then the 
parametric tests may be biased. Thereíore. distributional results presented at the section 5 
for the aeureiíated abnormal returns will no longer be valid. Brown and Warner (1985) 
point out that, in general, the use ot daily or vveekly data makes clustering of events on a 
sinele day much less severe than the use of monthly data. But diversification across 
industries mitigates the problem, as stated by Bernard (1987). Since our sample is highly 
diversified (ali industry sectors are present in our data) we hope to overcome the referred 
problem. Following the portfolio approach suggested by MacKinlay (1997). the abnomial 
retums for those securities that share the same event day were aggregated into a single 
portfolio. We have build up 171 different portfolios. with an average of 2.15 securities 
per portfolio. As a result our sample vvas thereafter reduced to 855 (522 purchases and 
333 sales). from the previous 1.052 transactions. 
Following Calvo et ed. (2002). we also built a non-overlapping sample in order to 
cuarantee that the abnormal retum calculation of an inside transaction is not influenced 
by the abnormal return oí an early event. We assume that vvhen insiders purchase or sell 
on consecutive davs. they are trading with the same pnvileged bit of information. In order 
to prepare our sample, we follow Duque and Pinto s (2004) piocedure to remove 
overlapping of event windows. Therefore. vvhen transactions occurred on consecutive 
days, or vvithin less than a íive-day time interval, it vvas assumed as a single inside 
transaction. and the "event day vvas assumed to include the entire time interval betvveen 
the day of the first event and the day of the last event. The use of such a procedure 
reduced our sample even further. From 855 we carne out with 450 transactions (_55 
purchases and 195 sales). 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology and notation for the modelling of abnormal returns (AR,-) follovv 
larcely MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997). We have done few additional 
adjustments in Une with the insider trading literature. 
The AR,- is computed by subtracting expected returns E [Ru | XT] from the actual returns 
Rit (the log return of company i at time t). 
ARit =Rit-E{R,t\Xt). (1) 
Xt stands for the conditioning set oí information íor the expected retuin. Event time (a 
counter) is denoted by x. with the event date corresponding to x = 0. Different authors use 
different models to estimate expected returns. However, Brown and Warner (1980) after 
comparinu different methodologies used in event studies shov\ed that bevond a simple. 
one factor market model, there is no evidence that more sophisticated methodologies 
convey any benefit. 
5.1. Market Model 
The market model is a statistical model, which relates the return of any given security to 
the return of the market portíolio. This method takes into account both market-wide 
factors and the systematic risk ot each sample security. We used the PSI-_0 index as a 
proxy to the market portfolio. For any security / the market model is 
£{£„ = 0) var(í„) = cr;. 
Sit is the zero mean disturbance term and a„ p,. and cr; are the parameters of the market 
model. 
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The OLS8 estimators of the market model parameters for an estimation window of 
obsen ations are 
P, 
O: 
r = /'„ +1 
à, = //. - /?Â (4) 
^ =T^T IsiK-á.-p.KrY 
(5) 




Pm =7- Z^r- 
L\ T = l„ + \ 
R1T and Rmx are the log retums in event period t for security i and for the market 
portfolio. respectively. 
Following the Brown and Warner"s (1985) procedure to compute the ARIT we have firstly 
considered an event window of eleven days [-5. +5]. which includes five days before the 
s
 Under general conditions OLS is a consistem estimation procedure for the market model parameters. 
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event. the event da\ . and fi\e days after insiders" transactions. Afterwards. and tollowina 
inside trading literature. \ve analysed other event w indous as well: [-5. -1 ]. [-1. -5]; 
[+1. +10]; [+1, +20] and [+1. +80]. The event day (x = 0) is taken as the day the insider 
transaction actually takes place. 
[eslimation windovv] I [event window ) i 
T(r -245 T,= -6 T=,, T:=-1,+5.+10.+20 or+80 
For eaeh security v\e use a maximum of 325 daily relurns observations for the period 
around its respective event. stailing at day To= -245 and ending at day T: = -1, + 5, +10. 
+20 or +80 relative to the event. depending on vvhich event windovv \ve chose to examine. 
The first 239 davs period (from x = To + 1 to x = T|) is called the estimation windovv. For 
those event periods that include days before the event day. namely [-5. +5] and 
[-5. -1]. the length of the event windovv is L: = T2 - Ti (11 or 5 days). For other event 
windows starting at day +1. the length of the event windovv is L2 = T2.g 
5.2. Abnormal Return and its Statistical Properties 
Given the market model parameter estimates, one can measure and analyse the AR1T. 
measured as 
ÀR,r=R.r-à,-/3lRmr. (6) 
The abnormal return is the disturbance term (slt from equation 2) of the market model 
calculated on a sample basis. Under the null hypothesis. eonditional on the event windovv 
market retums, the abnormal returns will be jointly normally distributed vvith a zero 
eonditional mean and eonditional variance cj2{ÂRit) where 
' It is typical for the estimation vvindow and the event windovv not to overlap. This desien provides 
estimators for the parameters of the normal return model, vvhich are not intluenced by the return around the 
event. 
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cr ' (AR .) - cr: + 
(A' . ■ u )■ 
L cr' 
7) 
The conditional \ariance has two components. One component is the disturbance 
variance cr~ (see equation 2) and a second component is the additional variance due to 
the sampling error in a, and (3,. 0 Under lhe null hçpothesis. Ho. that the event has no 
impact on the behaviour of returns (mean or \ariance) the distributional properties of the 
abnormal returns can be used to dravv inferences o\er any period within the event 
window. Under Hq the distribution of the sample abnormal return of a gi\ en observation 
in the event window is 
ÀRir - X(0.c7:(ÂR,r)). (8) 
If abnormal returns are independem, identically distributed and normal, the test statistic is 
distributed as StudenTs t under the null hypothesis. Brown and Warner (1985) show that 
as the degrees of freedom increase the distribution converges to a normal distribution. 
Since the degrees of freedom in our research exceed 200. the test statistic is assumed to 
be unit normal. 
5.3. Aggregation Through Time and Across Securities 
It is usual to aggregate the individual securities abnormal returns through time and across 
securities in order to draw overall inferences for the event under scope. We cumulate 
these abnormal over time to analyse the pre- and post-event period returns. Define CÀR 
(ti,!;) as the sample cumulative abnormal return (CAR), where X| and t: are the 
cumulating periods. Following Calvo eí al. (2002) and Cheuk et al. (2006) we analyse 
10
 As the length of the estimation window L, becomes large, the second term approaches zero. This is to be 
expected, since in this case the sampling error of the parameters vanishes. The variance of the abnormal 
return will be ay, and the abnormal return observations will be independem. In practice. in agreement with 
MacKinlay (1997), the estimation window can usually be chosen to be large enough to make it reasonable 
to assume that the contribution of the second component to the variance of the abnormal return is zero. 
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CAR for the [-5. -1] event window to assess signiíicance ot lhe CAR immediately hefore 
the event took place. and also CAR íor the [+1. +5]; [+1. ~10]; [ + E -20] and [-E -80] 
periods to evaluate the significance ot the excess returns after the transactions and íor 
how long il lingers. 
The CAR from x, to i: is the sum of the included abnomial returns. 
CAR (rrTC = y]ÀRir. (^) 
Asymptotically (for large Li) the variance of CÂR, is 
= (r:-r,+l)crt:. (10) 
The distribution of the cumulative abnormal return under Ho is 
Cd^(rpr:)~A'(0.a,:(rpr2)). O D 
Given the null distributions of the abnormal return and the cumulative abnormal return. 
tests of the null hypothesis can be performed. 
The abnormal return observations must be aggregated for the event window and across 
observations of the event." The individual securities" abnormal returns can be aggregated 
using ÀRIT from equation (6) for each event period x = T, + 1 T:. Given N events, the 
sample aggregated abnormal returns for period x is 
" We normally iook at the average effect of the announceinent rather than examine each firm separately, 
because other events are occurring and averaging across ali the firms should minimized the effect of these 
other events, thereby allowing a better examination of the event under study, according to Élton and Gruber 
(1995). For this aggregation. it is assumed that there is not any clustering. That is. there is not any overlap 
in the event windows of the included securities. 
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AR:=-ZÂR':- A ( = | 
and for laree Li, its variance is 
;m[ARr) = —7^ ct] . 03) 
3v ,=i 
The average abnormal returns can aftervvards be aggregated over the event window using 
the same approach as that used to calculate the cumulative abnormal return for each 
1 ^ 
securitv /. For an\- interval in the event window ' 
CAR{t,.tz) = Y.AR^ 04) 
var(C/)/?(r,. r1)) = ^ var( AR -). (15) 
Inferences about the cumulative abnormal returns can be drawn usim 
CAR{t^T. ) ~ N O, var(C4??(r, ,rD), (16 ) 
to test the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns are zero. In practice. because cr; is 
unknown. an estimator must be used to compute the variance of the abnormal returns as 
in (13). The usual sample variance measure of cr; from the market model regression in 
the estimation window is an appropriate choice. according to MacKinlay (1967). 
Using this to calculate var(.4??r) in (13). Ho can be tested using the following statisticsL, 
12
 For the variance estimators the assumption that the event windows of the N securities do not overlap is 
used to set the covariance terms to zero. 
'' This distributional result is asymptotic with respect to the number of securities N and the length of 
estimation window /.,. 
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AR r x ' / A i 




In order to test if our conclusions could be biased as a consequence ot an inadequate 
model for testing abnormal relurns. \ve also used the mean adjusted return and the market 
adjusted return models in the return-generating process. For the mean adjusted retum. 
abnormal return is taken as 
Mean adjusted retums are computed by subtracting the average return for stock i during 
the estimation period from the stock"s return during the event period. This method does 
not explicitly takes into account the risk of the stock and the return oí the market 
portfolio. 
For the market adjusted return. abnormal return is taken as. 
ARir=RIT~R,. (19) 
AR,r=Rir-R,llr. (20) 
Market adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the return on the market portfolio 
from the stocks return during the event windovv. 
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6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
\\'e have initialh applied the e\enl study methodolog\ described earlier to ali the 1.052 
transactions reported previously. Following Brown and Warner s (1085) methodology v^e 
started by eonsidering an event window ot eleven days [-5. +5]. After computing the 
abnormal returns (AR) \ve ean draw conclusions regarding the priees" performance at the 
event day and on each day surrounding the insiders" transactions as well. W'e apply the 
methodology for the purchases and sales samples. but also íor the aggregated 
transactions. As stated by Del Brio et al (2002). if we believe that both purchase and sale 
returns should be measured as positive abnormal returns in the overall sample. excess 
returns for insiders" sales should be multiplied by -1 for the purpose ot aggregation. The 
aggregated results we have obtained analysing 1.052 transactions are largely consistent 
with the literature providing evidences that a security return around insiders" trades 











Fiszure 1: A vera se Abnormal Retum 
□ 
Event Time 
□ □ □ 
This finding can be confirmed by analysing the statistical test described earlier, with the 
results being presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Results of Tests to Abnormal Return 
 Overall sampE  
Day AR Test 0, 
-5 -0,05° o -1.061 
-4 -0.20% -4,204 * * * 
-3 -0.13° o -2.832 * * * 
-0.09% -1.878 * 
-1 -0,27° o -5,782 * * 
0 -0.34° o -7,214 * * * 
1 0.07° o 1.409 
0.13% 2.802 * * * 
3 0,04% 0.798 
4 0.04° ó 0.890 
5 0.03% 0.683 
The symbols **, and * indicate two-tail significance 
at the 1%. 5o o and I00/o leveis, respectively. 
The first striking result is that insiders" transactions are preceded by negative abnormal 
retums during the five days before the event and íor the event day as vvell. vvhich means 
that insiders wait for a short-run persistent decline (inerease) in the stock price to buy 
(sell) shares. The individual day's abnormal returns were thereafter added to compute the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the events windovvs described earlier, with the 
results presented in Table 6. 
Table 6: Cumulative Dailv Abnormal Returns for Insider Tradinu Events 
Event window Overall sample Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test 6; CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0; 
Pre-event window [-5, -1] -0.75% -7,046 *** -0.18% -1.340 1.74° o 9,646 *** 
Transaction day [0J -0.34% -7,214 *** -0.15°o -2.570 ** 0.67° o 8.366 *** 
Post-event window [+1, +5] 0,31% 2,943 *** 0.35% 2.678 *** -0,25° o -1.361 
Post-event window [+1, +10] 0.40% 2,647 *** 0.54% 2.922 *** -0.15° o -0.575 
Post-event window [+1, +20] 0.76% 3.604 0.92% 3,501 *** -0.50° o -1.387 
Post-event window [+1. +80] 3.11% 7.329 *** 4.25°o 8.105 *** -1.14% -1.579 
The symbols ***. **, and * show two-tail significance at the IV 5% and 10oo leveis, respectively. 
CAR for pre-event window [-5. -1] confirms that an insider purchases (sales) occur after 
a period of lovv (high) stock price. After the event took place. the overall sample results 
(N=1.052) show that prices tend to inerease after insider purchases and decrease after 
insider sales, for ali the four post-event windows analysed. For the aggregated sample. 
the 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, and 80-day CAR are 0,31%. 0.40%, 0,76% and 3.11%. 
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respectively. and ali are statistically significam. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected 
vvith a 99% confidence levei. 
Breaking up the overall sample between purchases and sales. we found that tor lhe shares 
bought (TI=667). the patterns and results remain identical to those from the aggregated 
sample. Insiders are able to make profits from their purchases. since CAR is significantly 
positive within ali the event vvindows analysed. Since the abnormal return lingers for a 
period of at least 80 days (as illustrated in Figure 2). outsiders are capable of making 
abnormal profit by following insider purchases. Nevertheless. and according to 
Portuguese laws. Information regarding insider transactions is only available to the public 
at the time a company releases its annual reports. Therefore. although our fmdings 
succest the possibility of making abnormal profits by mimicking insider purchases. this 
strategy is not practicable due to the lack of Information immediately after the 
transactions take place. 





From the sales sample (N=385), CAR is positive and significam before the insider 
transactions happen, which means that insiders wait for a short-run increase in the stock 
price to sell shares. After the event day and for ali post-event vvindow, although being 
always negative, CAR points towards the absence of significam excess return. because 
the hypothesis that the variable is null is always accepted. Previous researches suggest 
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insider buN Íng is a slronger indicalor than selling. Insiders ma\ sell shares to invest lhe 
mone\ elseuhere. to pa\ ott loans. pay ott morlgages. etc. Insiders would ha\e little 
other ineentixe to bu\ unless the thought the stock price would inerease in the future. 
6.1. Firni and Transaction-Spccific Factors 
In order to studx an\ induslrx specitic ettect. \\e split the sample into industries. Table 7 
presents CAR according to industrç classitications tor the entire sample. 
íahle 7:Cumulali\e DaiK Ahnomial Kelurns tor Insider IraJinu b> InJustiA C lassilication 
1 Financial 1 Basic Materials 
1 Insider purchase Insider sales Insider purchase Insider sales 
Fa ent u indou CA R Test 0: CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0; 
[-5.-1] -0.74° o -5.015 *** 0,65° u 3,004 * + * 0,00% -0,008 3.56% 6,810 * + * 
[01 -O.ICo - ^ 1 s * + * 0.23% 2.355 * * 0.23° o 1,315 0.36% 1.528 
hl.-5] 0.14o o 0.951 0.02% 0.101 0.42" o 1,089 -0,36° o -0,695 
hl.-101 -o.o:0 o -0,090 0,06° o 0.204 0,54" o 0,989 -0,25% -0.336 
hl.^0] 0,1 l0o 0.358 -0.08° o -0.175 0.31% 0,403 0.89% 0.853 
[-1. -80] -1 .o:0 o -3.265 *** -0.03° n -0.033 1.75% 1.127 4.48° o 2 14S * + 
Communications Consumer. Cvclieal 
Insider purchase Insider sales Insider purchase Insider sales 
E\ ent \\ indow CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0; CAR Test 0: 
[-5.-1] 1.11% 3.004 1.60° o 4.332 *** -0,04% -0,143 6.91° o 6,254 
[0] -0,13% -0.817 0,88% s,342 * * ^ -0,13% -0.920 3,88% 7.856 *** 
[-1.-5] 0,97° o * * * -0.61% -1,648 * -0.12% -0,377 1.410 o 1.275 
hi.-io] 1.96% 3,755 * * * 0,39% 0.744 0,25% 0,566 -1,90° o -1.218 
hl.-20] 3.08% 4,179 *** 0.92% 1.246 1,11% 1.777 * -10.67% -4,827 *** 
hh+80] 13.61% Q J * * * 0.81% 0.547 5.51% 4.410 + -6.12o o -1.384 
Consumer, Non-cvclical Industrial 
Insider purchase Insider sales Insider purchase Insider sales 
Event window CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0: 
E-T-l] -2.13% -1.407 4.65% 4,404 * + * -1.16% -2 839 ^ * 0.99° o 1,919 * 
[0] -0.66% -0.979 0,49% 1.027 -0,11% -0.607 0
 
1 
J 5§ O •
 
1,260 
hl.-5] 0,02% 0,010 0.15% 0.140 0.44° o 1,084 -0,90°» -1,728 * 
hh+10] -0.62% -0,289 1,31% 0.879 -0.58o» -0,999 -0,71° o -0,965 




-2,06% -0.679 9.11% 4.314 *** -0,50% -0.605 -1.62% -1,558 
[-1.+80] -0.65% -0.108 -8.41% -1.991 ** 5.50% 3.356 *** -6.32% -3.049 ♦** 
The svmbols w. and "mdicate t\w-tail s ignitkance at the 1% 5%and 10%levels, respectiveK 
We refrain from analysing diversified. technology and utility industries, since each one 
had only one company (as shown in Table 3). The analysis of the six remaining sectors 
shows that only insiders from Communications industry are able to make significam 
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profits through insider purchases at ali the post-e\ent windows. lhe CAR ot Insider 
purchases over lhe 5-days. IQ-days. 20-days. and 80-days alter the transaction da> are ali 
sianificanlh posili\e at 0.97° o. 1.96%. 3.08% and 13.61%. respectively. The purchases 
made by insiders from the financial sector have the worst performance among the 
industries analysed. This contrasts with the conclusion of Baesel and Stein (1979) vvho 
found that bank directors earn larger premiums lhan ordinary insiders. In terms ot sale 
transactions. insiders of the consumer (cyclical) and industrial sectors tend to pertorm 
much better. 
As observed before. Wong (2002) and Seyhun (1998) noticed that insiders" benefít might 
vvell be a result of some size effect. Hax ing this in mind vve started by testing the inside 
trades split up by firm size. Table 8 shows the CAR grouped by the frm size. 
Table 8: Cumulative Dailv Abnormal returns for Insider Tradiniz Events by Firm Size 
Small 13 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
Event window CAR Test e2 CAR Test 0; 
[A.-l] 0,10% 0.390 3.36% 8.989 * * * 
[0] 0.03% 0.236 1,53% 9,160 * * * 
[+1-5] 0,49% 1.845 * 0.66% 1,770 * 








 1,48% 2.809 * * * -0,68% -0,903 
[+1, -80] 6.61% 6.269 * * * 1.17% 0.784 
Médium 1/3 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test 02 CAR Test 0. 
[-5.-1] 0,20% 0.808 1.57% 4,901 * * * 
[0] -0.21% -1.888 * 0.39% 2.737 * * * 
[+1.+5] 0.49% 1.980 * * -0.95% -2.962 * * * 
[+1,+10] 0.72% 2.047 * * -0.07% -0.155 
[+1, +20] 1.56% 3.127 * * * 0.60% 0.936 
[+1, +80] 8.92% 8.961 * * * -1.67% -1.303 
Larse 1/3 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test 0. CAR Test 02 
[-5,-1] -0,83% -5.495 *** 0.26% 1.192 
[0] -0.27% -3.994 * * * 0.09% 0,904 
[+1.+5] 0,07% 0,481 -0,45% -2.068 * * 
[+1,+10] -0.08% -0,385 -0,75% -2,428 * * 
[+1, +20] -0.29% -0.952 -1,42% -3.239 * * * 
[+1, +80] -2.80% -4.626 * * * -2.93% -3.339 * * * 
The symbols ***. and * Indicate two-tail significance at the l0o. 50o and 10% leveis, respectively. 
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For insider purchases. onlv the small and médium capitalisations sho\\ signiticantlv 
positive post-e\ent CAR. Cheuk et ai. (2006) argue that in many cases, especially in 
small firms. the separation oí management and ownership is rare. Since manager—o\\neis 
are. in ueneral. more informed about the business prospects of their own tirms. insider 
trading which imolves the directors of small corporations is likely to be the most 
profitable. Relatinu tlrm size to insider sales. the results show that only targe tums 
insiders are taking any abnomial benetit trom selling their stocks, lhe CAR tor ali the 
four post-event windows is negati\e and statistically signiticant. 
Following the conclusions of Jeng et ai (1999) \\e wonder whether insider trades are 
anvhow related to trade volume. Table 9 shows the CAR grouped by the relative trading 
volume of the transactions. 
Table 9: Cumulative DaiK Ahnormal Returns lor Insider Trading hvents b> Relative Tradina Volume 
Low 1/3 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
Event window CAR TestG. CAR Test 6. 
[-5.-1] -0,17% -0.774 1,18% 4,038 * * * 
[0] -0.04% -0,430 0,35% 2.702 * * * 
[+I.+5] 0.1 7% 0,767 -0.75% -2.549 * * 
[+1, +10] 0.22% 0,684 -0,73% -1.756 * 
Di,+20] 0,76% 1,689 * -1,53% -2.608 * * * 
[+1, +80] 4.04% 4.510 * * * -3,5 8o'o -3.060 * * * 
Médium 1/3 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test 0. CAR Test 9. 
[-5.-1] -0.26% -1,212 2,07% 6.991 * * * 
[0] -0.14% -1,462 0.83% 6.243 * * * 
[+1.+5] 0,10% 0.457 -0.05% -0,177 
Db+10] 1.01% 2.401 * * 0,25% 0,594 
[+1, +20] 1,01% 2,401 * * 0,34% 0.581 
Db-80] 2.56% 3.032 * * * 0.43% 0.364 
Hitzh 1 h 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test 0. CAR Test e; 
[-5,-1] -0.10% -0,397 1,96% 5.696 * * * 
[0] -0.27% -2.481 * * 0.84% 5.470 * * * 
DE+5] 0,78% 3,214 * * * 0.07% 0.193 
[+1. +10] 1.00% 2,907 * * * 0,04% 0,086 
[+1. +20] 0.98% 2.008 * * -0,31% -0.450 
f+l.+SO] 6.13% 6.283 * * * -0.25% -0.179 
The svmbols ***, **. and * indicate two-tail signitlcance at the l"o. 50'o and 10oo leveis, respectively. 
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Purchases in the high relati\e trading volume group predict better pertormanee tor ali the 
event windows. Por sales transactions. post-e\ent CAR is statisticallv signiticant onl_\ tor 
small relative trading volume, Phis means that larger ahnormal protlts are achieved vvhen 
insiders purchase in lareer hlocks or vvhen thev seli shares in smaller lots. Previouslv vve 
showed that insiders in Porluguese market usuallv sell shares in larger blocks. and now 
we tound that onlv shares sold in small lots bring the greatest protlts. Phis result is in line 
with tlndmes that insiders mav sell shares not to avoid losses through the exploitation ot 
private mtormation. but to invest the money elsevvhere or to supplv any consumptions 
need. Jeng a ul (lbbc)) also argue that insiders with si/eable eorporate holding may 
undertake high v olume sales to diversiheation or liquidity purposes. 
T he relationship betvveen the tvvo valuation ratios and abnormal return is examined next. 
Fable Itb Ci imulative 1 )aiK Ahnormal Rctums tor Insider Tradine T.venB b\ Price to Book Ratio 
Lovs 1 ' -» 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
l:\cut vsindi ( AR Test 0, CAR Test 0. 
b-A-ll 0,39" o 1,545 3,24% 9,166 * + + 
[OJ -0,06° o -0,556 1,42% 8,967 + * + 
[-1-5J 0,93"o 3,696 *** 0,54% 1,539 
[-1, -10] 1.73° o 4,877 *** 0,24% 0,476 
[-1,-201 2,46° o 4,897 *** -0,54% -0,759 
[-1,-80] 6,61% 6,577 4,60° o 3.253 
Médium 1/3 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test e: CAR Test 0, 
1-5,-1] -0,30% -1,282 0,51% 1,81 1 * 
[0] -0,07% -0,697 0,15% 1,223 
Dl.-?] -0.05% -0,214 -0,47% -1,684 + 
[-1,-10] -0,35% -1,051 -0,19% -0,465 
[-1,-20] 0,19% 0,41 1 -0,40% -0,717 
Dl,+80] 4,81% 5,144 *** -1,89° „ -1.679 
Hiiih 1 / J 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test e; CAR Test 02 
[-5,-1] -0,84% -3,730 *** 1,50% 4,998 * + * 
[0] -0.33% -3,281 *** 0,44% 3,253 * + * 
Dl.+5] 0,09% 0,405 -0,84% -2,780 * * * 
[+1.-10] 0.09% 0,280 -0,54% -1,272 
Dl,+20] -0,07% -0,166 -0,59% -0,973 
Dl, -80] 0,15% 0,169 -6,14% -5,104 * * * 
The iynibols •"X and * i ndieate tvvo-lail significance at the 1%, 50ó and 10% leveis, respeclively. 
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As noticed before. inside trading beneíits may well be related lo P B and P E ratios (see 
see Cheuk et al. (2006)). It is hypothesized that insiders tend to buy at periods of low P B 
and low P/E and sell at periods of high P/B and high P/E. Table 10 shows that stocks 
bought by insiders wilh the lowest P/B perform better than the stocks bought with 
médium and high ratio. Contrarily. íor stocks sold by insiders. the CAR is significantly 
neeative only for those shares with the highest P/B. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that a high P/B predicts bad future performance. 
A low P/E ratio is also associated with a high future stock return. while high P E is 
associated with a low future stock return. Table 11 illustrates this relationship. 
Table I I: Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns lor InsiJer Trading Events by Price Earmngs Ratio 
Low 1 /3  
Insider purchase Insider sales 
Event vvindow CAR Test 6; CAR Test 0: 
[-5.-1] -0.27oo -1.333 1,70% 5.548 *** 
[0] 0,07% 0.809 0,39% 2,830 *** 
[+1, +5] 0,39% 1.941 * -0,28% -0,920 
[+1,+10] 0,37% 1.286 -0,19% -0.449 
[+1, +20] 1.25% 3.098 *** -0.42% -0.690 
[+1.-80] 1.41 % 1.741 * -1.13% -0.928 
Médium 1/3 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test 0: CAR Test 0: 
[-5.-1] -0.58% _"> 313 * * 0.21% 0.819 
[0] -0,30% 914 * * * 0,31% 2,701 *** 
[+1, +5] 0.06% 0.242 -0.23% -0,922 
[+1,+10] -0.15% -0,472 -0.41% -1,149 
RI.+20] -0.19% -0.414 -0.71% -1.394 
[+1, +80] -0.30% -0.326 -0.76% -0.751 
Hiizh 1 ;3 
Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Test 0; CAR Test 0: 
[-5--1] -1,13% -4.558 *** 1,54% 4.448 *** 
[0] -0.23% -2,049 ** 0,40% 1.058 
[+1-+5] 0,59% 2.387 ** -0.43% -1.242 
[+1,+10] 0,36% 1.017 -0.62% -1,274 
[+1, +20] -0.51% -1,032 -1.38% -1.990 ** 
[-1. +80] -1.06% -1.072 -4.1 1% 953 *** 
The symbols ***■ **. and * indicaie tvvo-tail significance at the 1%. 5oo and 10oo leveis, respectively. 
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Therefore, as stated by Cheuk et al. (2006). it is likely that insiders. vxho are more able to 
assess the value of their firms, bux vvhen the P/E ot the stock is loxx. and sell xxhen the 
P/E is high. Table 11 shows that for the purchase sample. positive post-event CAR is only 
found in the loxx P/E group. Contrarily. for the sales transactions. post-event CAR is 
sianificantly negative only for the high P/E group. Both results are signihcant only for 
[+1. +20] and [+1. +80] event xvindoxvs. 
Overalk our results confirm that insiders take into account their company valuation 
before buying or selling stocks of their oxvn firms. 
6.2. Methodology Adjustments 
As explained before. xxe also used txvo altemative strategies in order to control the results. 
Abnormal returns xvere also computed using the mean adjusted return (equation 19) and 
the market adjusted return (equation 20). For the mean adjusted return. the pattems 
remain identical, as shovvn in Table 12 (xvhich compares xxith the results from Table 6). 
Table 12; CAR for Insider Tradine Events Usine the Mean Adjusted Return Model 
Event Windoxv Overall sample 
CAR TestG: 
Insider purchase 
CAR Test 0: 
Insider sales 
CAR Test0; 
Pre-event vvindow [-5, -1] 
Transaction day [0] 
Post-event vvindow [+1, +5] 
Post-event window [+1, +10] 
Post-event window [+1, +20] 
Post-event window f+1, ^-80] 
-1,08% -8.862 *** 
-0,46% -8,441 *** 
0.29% 2,401 ** 
0,3V+o 2,161 ** 
0,92% 3,771 *** 
4.41% 9.060 *** 
-0,54% -3.595 *** 
-0,26% -3,928 *** 
0,42% 2.754 *** 
0,72% 3.358 *:,t + 
1,43% 4.751 *** 
7.10% 11.767 *** 






The svmbols **+ and * indicate two-tail sienificance at the 1%. 5% and 10% leveis, respectively. 
Previously, vve have done some sample modifications and adjustments related to 
complications arising from violations of the statistical assumptions. These complications 
arise vvhen event xvindoxvs of the included securities overlap in terms of calendar time or 
vvhen abnormal return calculation is influenced by the abnormal return of an early event. 
These adjustments, hoxvever, did not modify our main conclusions and fmdings. 
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Table 13 reports the results. already taking into account the clustering issue. \\ e have go 
back to the market model. 
Tahle 13: Cumulative Dail\ Abnormal Returns Takin<i into Account the Clustering Issue 
Event Window Overall sample 
CAR Test O. 
Insider purchase 
CAR Test e: 
Insider sales 
CAR Test 0; 
Pre-event window [-5, -11 
Transaction day [0] 
Post-event window [+1. ^5] 
Post-event window [+1, +10] 
Post-event window [+1, +20] 
Post-event window f-H. +80] 
-0.75% -6.593 *** 
-0,35% -7,011 *** 
0,35% 3,103 *** 
0.46% 2.870 *** 
0.86% 3.803 *** 
3.36°o 7.438 ^ 
-0.1 1% -0.798 
-0.16% -2.557 ** 
0.46% 3.271 *** 
0.64°ó 3.211 *** 
1.05% 3.758 *** 
4.85% 8.657 ^ 
1,74% 9.150 *** 
0.66% 7.757 *** 




The symbols ***. **. and * indicate two-lail signitlcance at the 1%. 50o and 10 '»leveis, respectively. 
Althouah we have reduced the sample size and chosen a nevv approach for those 
transactions vvhere the clustering was noticeable in the event dates, the results remain 
mostly identicak and for the three samples, the statistical significant regions remain 
unchanged. Friederich et al. (2000) argue that although event clustering can affect the 
results through cross-sectional correlation of the excess returns. this is not necessarily a 
strons limitation vvhen different industries and daily data are used because the probability 
of events being clustered decreases under those circumstances. As the events in our 
research are relatively evenly distributed across the sample period. we are not expecting 
any bias relating to clustering. 
This portfolio approach allows us also to achieve a better fitting for the market model 
parameters. Using lhe initial sample (N=1.052). the average value for the coefficient of 
determination R: is 0,20. higher than the estimation found by Duque and Pinto (2004)14. 
The authors have used the PSI Geral index to compute the market return parameters, 
rather than the PSI-20 index that we use in our research. After the portfolio approach, R" 
coefficient average was slightly improved to 0,22. The average p, (0.70 for the 1.052 
sample or 0.72 for the 855 sample) differ substantially from 1, but the average beta was 
computed as a non-weight average of 28 securities (only 17 belonged to PSI-20 index at 
the end of the sample period, although they count for 98% of the benchmark value). 
14
 The higher the R-squared the larger the variance reduction of abnormal return. 
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lablc 14 reports the resulls taking mio account lhe elustenng issue and lhe non- 
oxerlappine approaeh simultaneousl). 
1 ablc 14; C AR 1 akinii into Accounl the C kisterini: Issue and a Non-l tverl appine Approaeh 
1 \ ciit \\ iikIou 1 Oeerall sample i Insider purchase 1 Insider sales l 
; ( AR IcslO, 1 CAR lesl 0, 1 PAR festt). 
Rrc-cvent u indou |-5 .-11 1 -0,71"., -4 7o: -0,2 1 " n -I.0S7 1 1.37" „ 5,633 + i 
1 ransaclmn da\ 101 1 -0,74" -in.sss -0,40"., -5,370 ; i io"„ lo.i 11 
t + t 
i 
Piist-cv cnl iiid(i\s | 1, '51 i 0.47"u 3.144 "D 0,50"., 2,601 1-0,45"., -1,838 * 
1'osl-cvcnt window | • 1, • 10| i 0,40"o 2.:so ++ i 0,67" „ 2.4 S4 ** • -0,25".. -0,730 
PosI-lwcnl w indow 1 ■ 1 ' 20| 1 0.5 1"„ I.OSl * 1 i 0,74" o 1,042 t !-0,20"., -0,417 l 
Post-c\cnt window | • 1, • S01 1 0,40" „ 0.S07 1 0.70" „ 0.02 1 1-0,21"., -0,212 
1 hc s\ mbols * *t, *t. and f indicale iwo- ■tail siunificaiKc at the 1"» , 5" ., and 1 0' leveis, respectively. 
I he DAR for lhe signifieant lesl lor lhe first three shorter post-event vvindovvs and the AR 
tor the e\enl dav remain rohust and praetieally identieal. h AR lor hoth 1-5, -1 j and | • I, 
+51 windows. where we ha\e eompletely eliminated lhe overlappina, are -(),710'o (O^ - 
4,704) and 0.47°,• (Oj ' 3,143). In lhe previous sample, DAR for [-5, -1| and 1 + 1, +5| 
event windows were -0.75% (0: = -6,503) and 0,35% (0: = 3,103). For longer periods, 
namely for lhe 1 + 1. +801 event window. lhe lesl 0; eease from being significam. Larger 
event windows eould rellect other taclors that lead shares lo rally or slump lhal is externai 
and outside the firm eontrol. and news or events that are unknovvn hy insider at the time 
the transaction is executed. 
One potential prohlem that can arise from using hoth lhe mean adjusted return and market 
model is that the results can he sensitive to the inclusion (or exclusion) of other event 
periods into the estimation period. Brown and Warner (1980) argue that it high leveis ot 
ahnormal performance are present. then including observations trom around the time ot 
the event gives more weight to apparent "Outliers", tending to increase the variance ot the 
security-specific performance measures, and lowering the power ot the tests. To cope 
with th is potential prohlem. we have redone the analysis using the market adjusted return 
model. This method allows for ahnormal return not to he contaminated by other events 
taking place during the estimation period. 
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The results are presented in Table 15. 
Table 1 5: Cumulative Dailv Abnormal Returns Usine the Vlarket Adjusted Return 
Event Window Overall sample Insider purchase Insider sales 
CAR Teste. CAR Test 6; CAR TestG; 
Pre-event window [-5, - 1] -0.58% -3.548 *** 0.02% 0.097 1.36% 5.246 *** 
Transaction day [0] -0.82% -1 1,226 *** -0.66% -7.087 *** 1.02% 8.836 *** 
Post-event window [+1, W5] 0.37% 2.255 ** 0.42% 2.010 ** -0.30% -1.159 
Post-event window [-1 -10] 0.25% 1.101 0.49% 1.684 * 0,06% 0.171 
Post-event window [+1. +20] 0.28% 0.860 0.73% 1.761 * 0.31% 0.602 
Post-event window [^1 -80] -0.51% -0.789 0.72% 0.872 2.13% 2.060 ** 
The symbols ***, **, and * indicate two-tail significance at the 1%. 50o and 10oo leveis, respectively. 
For the aggregate sample, the pattern and significance of the abnormal returns persist 
until the [+1. +5] event window, but vve loose the effect for the remaining post-event 
windows. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This study focused on insider trading in the Euronexl Lisbon stock market betvxeen 
January 2001 and December 2005. 
Although there exist other studies on the subject using similar methodologies and data 
treatment, this type of research is particularly sensitive to differences in jurisdiction. As 
noticed by Bhattacharya and Daouk"s (2002) and Beny (2005). inside trading legislation 
varies widely around the world vvith different impact on trading activity and míormation 
release. Even vvithin the European Union, that issued the "Directive 2003/6/EC". the rules 
and regulations do not provide a completely uniform set of practices. resulting on a 
country dependent effect. This is vvhy the results for the Portuguese market become 
relevant. 
Our overall results show that. although there exists legislation to regulate insiders" 
transactions in Portugal, they still seem to be able to make abnormal profits when trading 
shares of their own firms. We find patterns in abnormal retums that are consistem with 
directors engaging in short-term market timing: they sell (buy) after an increase (decline) 
in prices. and their trades are followed by a partial price reversal. 
We find that insiders time their trades and they convey information when they buy or sell 
securities in their own firms. but our results suggest that insider buying is a stronger 
indicator than insider selling. After the purchases take place, prices increase in ali the 
post-event windows analysed and the test 0; is always signiticant. After selling. prices 
decline, but the results point towards the absence of significam negative excess return. In 
Portugal, insiders seem to do far more buying than selling in the sample period. 
Therefore. when analysing the aggregated sample. the positive excess returns from 
purchases are more than enough to compensate the absence of significam negative return 
(multiplied by -1 for the purpose of aggregation) from insider sales. 
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Since the abnormal return linyers for a period ot at least 80 days. outsiders are capabk ot 
makine abnormal profit by mimicking insider trading. This is particular!) true tor insider 
purchases. Therefore. the results otter evidence inconsistent vvith the strong and semi- 
stronn form of efficient market hvpothesis. Ehe íirst one asserls that insiders should not 
be able to eam excess returns from privileged asymmetric intormation. and the second 
one alio ws for the existence of abnormal returns immediately after the inside transactions. 
bui not on other da\ s. 
A possible explanation for this lies in the fact that companies operating in Portugal do not 
immediately disseminate their insider transactions intormation to the public. According to 
Baesel and Stein (1979). if the market was efficient in the semi-strong sense. insiders 
could use their information profitably, but once the intormation or intormation on the 
insider tradinn actixit) is released to the pubhc it will have no turther trading \alue. In 
Portuaak lhe public only gets access to the insider trading intormation at the moment a 
companv releases its annual report. This means that outsiders do not have access to 
information allowing them to mimic an insider transaction immediately after it took 
place. When the information finally arrives at the public. it is already worthless m tems 
of trading value. Therefore, vve conjecture that the ineffrciency in the Portuguese stock 
market arises from the lack of information at the right time. rather than from the inability 
of security prices to adjust quickly to fully reflect new information. The "Directive 
2003/6/EC" of the European Parliament, regarding the release of insider trading 
information recommends that member States shall ensure that issuers inform the public as 
soon as possible of inside information1". In Portugal, this recommendation has not up till 
novv being followed. 
In Spain. for instance. Comision Nacional dei Mercado de Valores (CNMV). which is the 
Spanish version of the Portuguese CMVM, requires insiders to report their trading within 
fifteen davs following the trade, but unlike Portugal, the tiles remitted by the insiders are. 
from that moment on. available to the public. Even though for the Spanish stock markets. 
Del Brio et ai (2002) results suggest a semi-strong efficient market, where insiders are 
15
 Article n. 0 6 from the ""Directive 2003/6/EC" 
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able to beat the market by investing using their private information. vvhile outsiders 
cannot earn abnormal profits by using the publicly available information concerning 
insider trades compiled by the CNMV. 
Even if outsiders in Portugal had access to insider information vvithout dela\. our results 
succest that some insiders transactions may comprise more information than others. 
For the shares bouuht. \ve íind that the largest and persistent abnormal retums are íound 
in purchases that have some common denominators: the firm belongs preferentially to the 
communication industry; the firm is small or médium in terms ot market capitalization; 
the relative tradinu volume of the purchase is high and the price to book ratio and the 
price earnings ratio of the security is small. 
For the shares sold. although the results trom analysing the entire sample point towards 
the absence of significam negative excess returns. there are some íirm and transaction- 
specific factors that lead abnormal returns to fali within the statistical significam regions. 
These sales have some common features: the íirm is usually a consumer (cyclical) or an 
industrial companv; the íirm is large in terms of market value; the relative tradmg volume 
of the sales is lovv and the price to book ratio and the price earnings ratio of the shares 
sold are typically high. 
We have previously shovved that insiders in the Portuguese market usually sell shares in 
larger blocks, and novv we found that only shares sold in small lots (measured by relative 
tradinc volume) bring the greatest abnormal profits. W e presume that insiders are 
compelled to sell shares in larger blocks to invest the money elsevvhere. vvithout concem 
to beat the market by timing their sales. On the other hand. vvhen insiders sell small 
amounts of shares, they care about the best moment to trade. 
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